Constructing consent in the Australian Capital Territory by Murphy, Brendon
 
	





This article considers the way in which consent has been constructed and 
evolved in the criminal law in the context of sexual assault. The article 
compares and contrasts the test for consent across the Australian 
jurisdictions, with particular interest on consent in the ACT – the only 
jurisdiction in Australia with a negative consent model. The article examines 
the intersection of common law and legislation in that jurisdiction, and 
considers how consent came to be framed this way in that jurisdiction. It 
suggests that the ACT will likely adopt a two-part reform based on the law 




The essential element of sexual offences in Australian law is the absence of consent. 
The absence of consent transforms what is normally a physical expression of affection 
and intimacy into crime and violence. For this reason, Australian law places 
considerable attention on the meaning and evidence of consent in sexual offences – 
especially in cases of sexual assault. One of the current problems in Australian criminal 
law is the way in which consent is established as a matter of law. This is particularly the 
case in the Australian Capital Territory (‘ACT’), where consent is expressed in negative 
terms. In this jurisdiction, consent is determined by what it is not, rather than what it 
is. It is argued in this article that this definition requires statutory alteration to bring 
the meaning of the term into line with the rest of the country. As discussed below, 
Australian law concerned with consent has evolved a two-pronged test involving a 
positive and negative component. The positive component involves establishing the 
fact of consent, while the negative component involves a legal erasure of the fact of 
consent if certain conditions are met. To this is a third aspect, which is the question of 
the perception of consent on the part of the accused. This aspect has evolved as a 
defence of mistake of fact. These elements are overlapping and connected, however, for 
the purposes of this article the focus is on the first elements concerned with establishing 
consent. 
 
II THE CONTOURS OF CONSENT 
 
Consent in the context of sexual assault has generated a vast amount of literature.1 
Much of that literature has been reform-oriented. Indeed, consent in sexual assault 
 
* Dr Brendon Murphy (BSW(Hons), LLB(Hons), DipLegPrac, GCPTT, PhD) is Associate 
Professor of Criminal Law at the Thomas More School of Law, Australian Catholic University. 
1 As an introductory sample, see Theodore Bennett, 'Consent Interruptus: Rape Law and Cases 
of Initial Consent.' (2017) 19(2) Flinders Law Journal 184; Annie Cossins, 'Why Her Behaviour 
Is Still On Trial: The Absence Of Context In The Modernisation Of The Substantive Law On 
Consent' (2019) 42(2) University of New South Wales Law Journal 499; Ian Leader-Elliott and 
Ngaire Naffine, 'Wittgenstein, Rape Law And The Language Games Of Consent' (2000) 26(1) 
Monash University Law Review 73; Wendy Larcombe, ''Worsnop v The Queen': Subjective 
Belief In Consent Prevails (Again) In Victoria's Rape Law' (2011) 35(2) Melbourne University 
Law Review 697; Jonathan Crowe, 'Consent, Power And Mistake Of Fact In Queensland Rape 
Law' (2011) 23(1) Bond Law Review 40; Jonathan Crowe and Lara Sveinsson, 'Intimidation, 
Consent And The Role Of Holistic Judgments In Australian Rape Law' (2017) 42(1) University 
of Western Australia Law Review 154; Beatrice Diehl, 'Affirmative Consent In Sexual Assault: 
Prosecutors' Duty' (2015) 28(3) Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 503; Janet Napolitano, 
'"Only Yes Means Yes": An Essay On University Policies Regarding Sexual Violence And Sexual 
Assault' (2015) 33(2) Yale Law & Policy Review 387; Michael Scott, 'Jake And Josie Get Drunk 
And Hook Up: An Exploration Of Mutual Intoxication And Sexual Assault' (2017) 54(4) Alberta 
Law Review 1061; Noah Hilgert, 'The Burden Of Consent: Due Process And The Emerging 




cases is one of those matters that tends to generate a great deal of publicity and 
associated demands for law reform. At the time of writing there are, in fact, two Law 
Reform Inquiries concerned with proposed changes to sexual assault consent rules.2 It 
is not the purpose of this article to undertake a systematic literature review of the 
available scholarship. Such an undertaking is beyond our scope. The purpose of this 
article is to outline something of the nature of consent as concept, and then focus 
sharply on the state of current doctrine. We therefore begin with setting out the 
contours of consent. 
 
Consent has three distinct dimensions: philosophical, semantic and legal. The three are 
linked. Philosophically, the western legal tradition assigns a significant importance to 
consent because of its association with the liberty of the individual, and the exercise of 
reason. Consent is a key aspect of the will and has come to be regarded as an integral 
part of assessing the moral right or wrong of behaviour. Consent, unlike intent, is 
concerned with the acceptance, merger or acquiescence of the will of another. Consent 
is the rational merger of self and other. In this respect it is regarded as an aspect of 
moral or ethical philosophy, and as such a central component in criminal liability for 
conduct involving questions of consent. 3  In this context the ability to consent, to 
surrender or agree, is a core aspect of autonomy and the capacity to exercise personal 
agency. Consent has transformative effect. As observed by Hurd, the grant of consent 
can transform the moral “right” of actions in two ways. First, it can make a wrong action 
“right” through the grant of permission to perform what would otherwise be a “wrong”. 
Second, it conveys a right to perform an action that is wrongful of itself.4 Intentional or 
knowing actions perpetrated against a person in the knowledge that person is not 
consenting is a foundational principle of criminal responsibility. 5  Here the 
philosophers remind us that consent always involves an exercise of the will; it is a 
function of reason, and as this is part of shared human experience, there is broad 
acceptance that rationally extending permission, agreement, acceptance or mutual 
purpose is the foundation of moral transformation. 
 
This merger of the minds is reflected in the language constructs around consent. In 
English, the word “consent” has its origins in Old French (consentir), sourced in Latin 
(consentire). It is a concept also linked to “consensus”, being distinguished between 
personal and collective sharing of views. To consent means to “express willingness, give 
 
Adoption Of The Affirmative Consent Standard In Sexual Assault Laws' (2016) 58(3) Arizona 
Law Review 899; David Ross, 'Consent in Criminal Law' (2009) 32(1) Australian Bar Review 
76; Wendy Larcombe et al, 'Reforming The Legal Definition Of Rape In Victoria - What Do 
Stakeholders Think?' (2015) 15(2) QUT Law Review 30; Andrew Dyer, 'The Mens Rea For 
Sexual Assault, Sexual Touching And Sexual Act Offences In New South Wales: Leave It Alone 
(Although You Might Consider Imposing An Evidential Burden On The Accused)' (2019) 48 
Australian Bar Review 63. 
2 New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Consent in Relation to Sexual Offences (2019); 
Queensland Law Reform Commission, Review of Consent Laws and the Excuse of Mistake of 
Fact (2020). 
3 Andrew Ashworth and Jeremy Horder, Principles of Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 
7th ed, 2013); Joel Feinberg and Russ Shafer-Landau, Reason and Responsibility: Readings in 
Some Basic Problems of Philosophy (Cengage Learning, 16th ed, 2016); Celia Wells and Oliver 
Quick, Reconstructing Criminal Law (Cambridge University Press, 4th ed, 2010); Alan Norrie, 
Crime, Reason and History: A Critical Introduction to Criminal Law (Cambridge University 
Press, 2nd ed, 2001); Patricia Kazan, 'Sexual Assault and the Problem of Consent' in Stanley 
French, Wanda Teays and Laura Purdy (eds), Violence Against Women: Philosophical 
Perspectives (Cornell University Press, 1998) 27-42; David Archard, 'Informed Consent: 
Autonomy and Self-Ownership' (2008) 25(1) Journal of Applied Philosophy 19; Larry 
Alexander, 'The Ontology of Consent' (2014) 55(1) Analytic Philosophy 102; Franklin Miller and 
Alan Wertheimer (eds), The Ethics of Consent: Theory and Practice (Oxford University Press, 
2009). 
4 Heidi M. Hurd, 'The Moral Magic of Consent' (1996) 2(2) Legal Theory 121. 
5 HLA Hart, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law (Clarendon 
Press, 2nd ed, 2008). 




permission, agree”. It is a voluntary agreement. A distinction is made, however, 
between mere consent and informed consent. The latter is linked to “permission 
granted in the knowledge of the possible consequences … with full knowledge of the 
possible risks and benefits”.6 This distinction is important, and often overlooked. There 
is a distinction between consent given in the absence of sufficient information, and the 
presence of sufficient or complete information. A decision made on the basis of a 
complete picture enables the exercise of a greater level of reason than insufficient or 
absent information; and is starkly contrasted with consent made on the basis of 
misrepresentation, false or deceitful information. There are, in effect, distinctions 
between kinds of consent. In the context of sexual intercourse the idea of “informed 
consent” would be absurd in the sense of requiring explicit information sharing of 
details equivalent to a formal contract, but it appears that something more than “mere 
consent”, in the sense of simple acquiescence to a sexual advance is what is expected. 
In other words, there is a requirement for sufficient information of matters of concern 
or importance to be known and communicated. 
 
These distinctions intersect with theoretical and substantive law in numerous ways. 
Feinberg, in his analysis of harm (as a setback of interests) as a core principle of 
criminal law theory, argued that the presence of consent removes the perception of 
harm or setback of interest in those who extend the consent. Accordingly, the moral or 
affective basis for harm is transformed by the presence of actual consent. The difficulty 
in law, recognised by Feinberg, is that the fact of consent does not necessarily mean a 
“harm” has not been suffered. Here Feinberg drew a distinction between “harms” and 
“wrongs”. In this context a “harm” is linked to a tangible interest, while a “wrong” is 
the (moral) right attached to it. Normally these concepts are merged, but in the case of 
consent, the “wrong” is neutralized, even though the harm continues or becomes 
manifest. 7  Feinberg suggests this principle has ancient life in the English legal 
tradition, tracing the origins into Roman law, and ultimately into Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics. Here Aristotle outlined a principle of reason, and ethical 
governance, that the foundation of injury to another is any situation where a person 
acts with the intention of causing injury to another, “contrary to the wish of the person 
acted on.”8 This principle has become manifest in the Latin maxim Volenti non fit 
injuria (“To one who has consented, no wrong can be done”). 
 
The problem alluded to by Feinberg and others is the distinction between a physical 
and an incorporeal interest. Feinberg’s theory, although rightfully well regarded, does 
not adequately distinguish between the interests at the core of this theory. And this is 
core business of the criminal law. A distinction between physical and non-physical 
interests is a useful starting point, as we able to start tracking the importance of consent 
in the context of physical acts. Here the starting point in the criminal law relating to 
consent is the principle on inviolability. This principle is that our bodies may not be 
interfered with by others in the absence of consent. The principle was articulated by 
Blackstone in these terms: 
[T]he law cannot draw the line between different degrees of violence and 
therefore totally prohibits the first and lowest stage of it; every man’s person 
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This principle of inviolability is the “beginning of wisdom” in understanding the 
contours of consent in the context of criminal law. But it overlaps with other aspects of 
liberty, including the idea of autonomy and liberty. The ability to give consent is an 
exercise in decision making, and where it relates to the control a person is able to 
exercise over their own life, it is a cherished expression of freedom and self-
determination. However, in the context of the criminal law – our present subject – we 
are primarily concerned with the exercise of decisions that convey agreement that the 
inviolability of our physical selves may be interfered with, if not shared.  
 
There are, of course, many instances where the fact of consent does not erase the harm 
done. Accordingly, the law constructs many and numerous exceptions to the meaning 
of consent. Indeed, there are so many layers of consent that it is perhaps best to speak 
of “meanings” of consent. In particular, the distinction between “mere consent” and 
“informed consent” is of critical importance in the law, and, as we will see, particularly 
in the criminal law. In the context of sex offences, this distinction is critical. The reform 
argument considered in the concluding remarks contends that the proper foundation 
of consent in relation to conduct that infringes the inviolability of self can only be linked 
to informed consent. That is, a person gives valid consent only where there is voluntary 
agreement grounded in actual knowledge of the scope of the anticipated sexual activity. 
But as we will observe, the contours of consent in Australian law are remarkably 
complicated. 
 
III CONSENT IN AUSTRALIA 
 
A Consent and Common Law Rape 
 
The core principle of consent (generally), was set out in Marion’s Case in 1992.10 Here 
a majority of the High Court,11 after referring to the inviolability principle outlined by 
Blackstone above, stated: 
Consent ordinarily has the effect of transforming what would otherwise be 
unlawful into accepted, and therefore acceptable, contact. Consensual contact 
does not, ordinarily, amount to assault. However, there are exceptions to the 
requirement for, and the neutralising effect of, consent and therefore 
qualifications to the very broadly stated principle of bodily inviolability. In 
some instances consent is insufficient to make application of force to another 
person lawful and sometimes consent is not needed to make force lawful …. The 
rationale for this exception appears to rest in the idea that some harms involve 
public, not just personal, interests.12 
 
In this instance we observe many of the legal contours: the transformation of the event 
from unlawful to lawful; and a range of public policy limitations on the extent of 
consent, based on collective as opposed to individual interests. Moreover, in the context 
of the criminal law, consent is located at multiple sites and differing contexts, and 
accordingly, consent can take on a distinct meaning in a particular legal context. As 
stated above, the present article relates to the meaning of consent in the context of rape 
and sexual assault.  
 
 
10 Department of Health & Community Services v JWB & SMB ("Marion's Case") (1992) 175 
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11 Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ. 
12 Department of Health & Community Services v JWB & SMB ("Marion's Case") (1992) 175 
CLR 218, 233 (Footnotes omitted). 




Rape was an offence at common law, manifested in England as early as the Laws of 
Aethelbehrt,13 and later documented in Mathew Hale’s Pleas of the Crown.14 As is well 
known, at common law the offence of rape involved “carnal knowledge of a woman 
without her consent”.15 Or, as stated by Blackstone, “carnal knowledge of a woman 
forcibly and against her will.”16 The change in language is not accidental. It reflects an 
evolution in the law, which in its early stage had emphasised the use of force, while the 
latter emphasised the role of consent – recognising that rape did not require the use of 
force.17 At common law the question of what constituted consent was largely a question 
of fact at trial, with consent having its “ordinary meaning”. The common law position 
was perhaps best expressed by Lord Justice Dunn in R v Olugboja:18 
….'consent'…covers a wide range of states of mind in the context of intercourse 
between a man and a woman, ranging from actual desire on the one hand to 
reluctant acquiescence on the other. We do not think that the issue of consent 
should be left to a jury without some further direction. What this should be will 
depend on the circumstances of each case. The jury will have been reminded of 
the burden and standard of proof required to establish each ingredient, 
including lack of consent, of the offence. They should be directed that consent, 
or the absence of it, is to be given its ordinary meaning and if need be, by way 
of example, that there is a difference between consent and submission; every 
consent involves a submission, but it by no means follows that a mere 
submission involves consent: … In the majority of cases, where the allegation is 
that the intercourse was had by force or the fear of force, such a direction 
coupled with specific references to and comments on the evidence relevant to 
the absence of real consent will clearly suffice. In the less common type of case 
where intercourse takes place after threats not involving violence or the fear of 
it, as in the examples given by counsel for the appellant, to which we have 
referred earlier in this judgment, we think that an appropriate direction to a 
jury will have to be fuller. They should be directed to concentrate on the state 
of mind of the complainant immediately before the act of sexual intercourse, 
having regard to all the relevant circumstances, and in particular the events 
leading up to the act, and her reaction to them showing their impact on her 
mind. Apparent acquiescence after penetration does not necessarily involve 
consent, which must have occurred before the act takes place. … the dividing 
line … between real consent on the one hand and mere submission on the other 
may not be easy to draw. Where it is to be drawn in a given case is for the jury 
to decide, applying their combined good sense, experience and knowledge of 
human nature and modern behaviour to all the relevant facts of that case.19 
 
This approach to consent has the considerable advantage of being flexible enough to 
consider the full factual matrix,20 and, as Dunn LJ observed, it enables the tribunal of 
fact to bring “good sense, experience and knowledge of human nature and modern 
behaviour to all the relevant facts of that case.” The problem, however, is that “consent” 
does not have a settled or consistent meaning in the wider community. Indeed, in the 
context of consent to sexual intercourse, empirical studies have shown widespread 
myths about how people communicate with one another in expressing desire for sexual 
 
13 Lisi Oliver, The Beginnings of English Law (University of Toronto Press, 2002) 79. “77. If a 
person takes a maiden by force: to the owner [of her protection] 50 shillings, and afterwards let 
him buy from the owner his consent [to marry her].” 
14 Matthew Hale, Historia Placitorum Coronae : The History Of The Pleas Of The Crown (R.H. 
Small, 1 ed, 1847) vol 1, 627. 
15 Papadimitropoulos v The Queen (1957) 98 CLR 249, 261. 
16 Blackstone, above n 9, vol IV, 210. 
17 Great Britain. Advisory Group on the Law of Rape, Report of the Advisory Group on the Law 
of Rape. (HMSO, Cmnd 6352 ed, 1975) 3. 
18 [1981] 3 All ER 443. 
19 [1981] 3 All ER 443, 448-449. 
20 Simon Bronitt and Bernadette McSherry, Principles of Criminal Law (Lawbook Co., 4th ed, 
2017) 666-669. 




acts, what role intoxication plays in decision making, tolerance for physical resistance, 
and sexual assault in relationships.21  These issues complicate the determination of 
consent in sexual assault trials, which makes the work of the courts that much harder, 
particularly in relation to giving jury instructions during cases that involve contested 
consent, or situations where both parties were intoxicated. It is no wonder rape has 
been the subject of significant law reform over the last 40 years. 
 
B  Statutory Reform of Consent 
 
In Australia the offence of rape has been placed on a statutory footing. 22  In all 
jurisdictions the common law has been abolished and replaced by a statutory 
framework. In most cases the term “rape” has been replaced. In all cases the absence 
of consent is a physical element of the offence, and accordingly is an essential 
consideration at trial. It is very often the case that the question of consent is the main 
point of contention. Consequently, the more recent cases that consider consent do so 
on the basis of the relevant legislation. What has emerged out of these cases is an 
emphasis on consent being freely and voluntarily given. The scope of this requirement 
was articulated by King CJ in a referred case in the South Australian Court of Criminal 
Appeal in 1993: 
The law on the topic of consent is not in doubt. Consent must be a free and 
voluntary consent. It is not necessary for the complainant to struggle or 
scream. Mere submission in consequence of force or threats is not consent. The 
relevant time for consent is the time when sexual intercourse occurs. Consent, 
previously given, may be withdrawn, thereby rendering the act non-consensual. 
A previous refusal may be reversed thereby rendering the act consensual. That 
may occur as a consequence of persuasion, but, if it does, the consequent 
consent must, of course, be free and voluntary and not mere submission to 
improper persuasion by means of force or threats.23 [Emphasis added] 
 
This position forms the foundation of the way consent is expressed in statute across the 
Australian jurisdictions. This concept forms the nucleus, however, of an increasingly 
complex set of limits and exceptions. In addition, one of the further complexities in 
relation to consent is the knowledge the accused has in relation to the absence of 
consent.  
 
While the presence or absence of consent is a physical element of the offence, the 
knowledge of the accused forms part of the fault element (mens rea) of the offence. But 
as we will see, the law has also extended the inquiry into the context in which the 
consent was given. In this respect attempts to define consent have had to address the 
expression of consent by the complainant, as well as the understanding of that consent 




21  Ibid. Here the learned authors were referring to a 2013 study on National Community 
Attitudes towards Violence Against Women. Compare this with the most recent 2017 study, 
which has found substantial (positive) changes in attitudes. Although there are positive changes, 
one concerning finding was that 19% of those surveyed did not recognise that it was a criminal 
offence for a man to have sex with his wife without her consent. See 
https://ncas.anrows.org.au/wp-
content/uploads/2019/04/300419_NCAS_Summary_Report.pdf. Attitudes with respect to 
consent are more alarming with respect to migrants. Here is was found that 25% of those 
surveyed believed that if a woman was sexually assaulted while intoxicated, she was “at least 
partly responsible”. https://ncas.anrows.org.au/findings/n-mesc-findings/. 
22 For a comparison with the UK, see David Ormerod, Smith & Hogan: Criminal Law (Oxford 
University Press, 12th ed, 2008). 
23  Question of Law Reserved on Acquittal Pursuant to Section 350(1a) Criminal Law 
Consolidation Act (No 1 of 1993) (1993) 59 SASR 214, 220. 




1 New South Wales 
 
In NSW the common law offence of rape was abolished in 2003.24 It has been replaced 
by a series of “sexual assault” offences, including sexual assault,25 aggravated sexual 
assault,26 aggravated sexual assault in company,27 sexual intercourse with a child under 
10,28 sexual intercourse with a child aged between 10 and 16,29 and sexual intercourse 
with a child aged between 16 and 18 in special care.30  A fundamental distinction 
relating to consent exists between these offences. As a matter of law, a child cannot 
lawfully consent to sexual intercourse.31 Accordingly, consent is not an element of an 
offence involving a child complainant. 
 
In this jurisdiction consent has been heavily modified by statute. Consent is set out in 
section 61HE, and requires close reading. For the purposes of the Crimes Act, the 
definition of consent applies to a limited range of offences, being sexual assault, sexual 
touching and sexual acts in both their ordinary and aggravated forms.32 Consent is 
specifically defined: A person consents to a sexual activity if the person freely and 
voluntarily agrees to the sexual activity.33 Here “sexual activity” is defined to include 
sexual intercourse, sexual touching, or sexual acts.34 All of these are further defined.35 
The accused is deemed to have knowledge of the absence of consent where they have 
actual knowledge,36 was reckless as to consent,37 or where there were no reasonable 
grounds to believe the person was not consenting.38 The fact of consent can also be 
negated as a matter of law, where: 
• The complainant lacks capacity to consent;39 
• There is no opportunity to consent;40 
• The person surrenders because they are coerced, intimidated,41 or unlawfully 
detained;42 
• Mistaken beliefs about the identity43 or marriage to the accused;44 or that the 




24 Crimes Amendment (Sexual Offences) Act 2003 (NSW), s63. This section was renumbered 
as s80 in 2018. See Criminal Legislation Amendment (Child Sexual Abuse) Act 2018 (NSW), 
Sched 1 [9]. 
25 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s61I: “Any person who has sexual intercourse with another person 
without the consent of the other person and who knows that the other person does not consent 
to the sexual intercourse is liable to imprisonment for 14 years.”. 
26 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s61J. 
27 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s61JA. 
28 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s66A. 
29 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s66C. 
30 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s73. 
31 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s80AE. 
32 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s61HE(1). 
33 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s61HE(2). 
34 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s61HE(11). 
35 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s61HA, HB and HC respectively. 
36 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s61HE(3)(a). 
37 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s61HE(3)(b). 
38 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s61HE(3)(c). 
39 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s61HE(5)(a). 
40 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s61HE(5)(b). 
41 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s61HE(5)(c). 
42 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s61HE(5)(d). 
43 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s61HE(6)(a). 
44 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s61HE(6)(b). 
45 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s61HE(6)(c). 
46 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s61HE(6)(d). 




A further qualification exists, that permits a finding that person has not given consent 
in circumstances where the complainant was “substantially intoxicated”, 47  was 
intimidated or coerced (in a manner falling short of threats);48 or the accused had taken 
advantage of a position of authority or trust.49  
 
2. Northern Territory 
 
The Northern Territory prohibits acts of sexual intercourse and gross indecency 
without consent;50 including offences against children under 16;51 those under 18 if in 
special care;52 and sexual intercourse with disabled or mentally ill people in care.53 As 
in the other jurisdictions, a child or person in special care cannot consent to sexual 
intercourse.54 For offences involving adults, “consent” is defined as “free and voluntary 
agreement”. 55  And, consistent with other jurisdictions, the fact of consent can be 
negatived where it has been procured through threat, force or fear; 56  where the 
complainant has been unlawfully detained;57 where the person was asleep, unconscious 
or intoxicated;58 incapable of understanding the sexual nature of the act;59 mistake as 





In Queensland the crime of rape was codified in the Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld). In 
its current manifestation, rape is an offence pursuant to s349.63 Here the absence of 
consent is an essential element. Consent is a defined term, meaning: freely and 
voluntarily given by a person with the cognitive capacity to give the consent.64 There 
are no qualifications as expressed in NSW, with the question of consent being a 
question of fact. There are, however, nominated grounds which it may be found the 
consent was not freely given, which includes use of force, threat, fear, abuse of 
authority, fraud and mistaken belief. These conditions are not exhaustive, and it is 
otherwise open ended.65 In this context, like NSW, a child may not give consent. An 
important distinction, however, is that for the purposes of rape, the age limit is 12.66 
 
 
47 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s61HE(8)(a). 
48 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s61HE(8)(b). 
49 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s61HE(8)(c). 
50 Criminal Code Act 1983 (NT) s192. 
51 Criminal Code Act 1983 (NT) s127. 
52 Criminal Code Act 1983 (NT) s128. 
53 Criminal Code Act 1983 (NT) s130. 
54 Criminal Code Act 1983 (NT) s139A. 
55 Criminal Code Act 1983 (NT) s192(1). 
56 Criminal Code Act 1983 (NT) s192(2)(a). 
57 Criminal Code Act 1983 (NT) s192(2)(b). 
58 Criminal Code Act 1983 (NT) s192(2)(c). 
59 Criminal Code Act 1983 (NT) s192(2)(d). 
60 Criminal Code Act 1983 (NT) s192(2)(e). 
61 Criminal Code Act 1983 (NT) s192(2)(f). 
62 Criminal Code Act 1983 (NT) s192(2)(g). 
63 Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) s349: “(1)Any person who rapes another person is guilty of a 
crime. Maximum penalty—life imprisonment. (2) A person rapes another person if— (a)the 
person has carnal knowledge with or of the other person without the other person’s consent; or 
(b)the person penetrates the vulva, vagina or anus of the other person to any extent with a thing 
or a part of the person’s body that is not a penis without the other person’s consent; or (c)the 
person penetrates the mouth of the other person to any extent with the person’s penis without 
the other person’s consent.” 
64 Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) s348(1). 
65 Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) s348(2). 
66 Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) s349(3). This section was inserted in 2003, pursuant to the 
Evidence (Protection of Children) Act 2003 (Qld) s11. 




4. South Australia 
 
Rape is an offence in South Australia.67 Like other Australian jurisdictions, the offence 
is one in which the absence of consent is an essential element. In this jurisdiction 
consent is simply defined, but the statutory definition includes a number of qualifiers. 
Here a person consents to sexual activity if the person freely and voluntarily agrees 
to the sexual activity.68 It is open to the tribunal of fact to conclude a person did not 
consent where the person succumbs to threats;69 was unlawfully detained;70 asleep or 
unconscious;71 intoxicated to the extent they could not freely and voluntarily consent;72 
suffered from a cognitive impairment;73 was unable to understand the nature of the 
activity;74 or where the person was mistaken either about the identity of the accused,75 




In Tasmania, the Criminal Code Act 1924 prohibits rape,77 as well as similar crimes 
involving a “young person”.78 In this jurisdiction a “young person” is under 17 years of 
age. Consent with respect to offences involving a young person is a defence only where 
the accused is up to 3 or 5 years older than the complaint.79 As in other jurisdictions 
around Australia, consent means free agreement. 80  The fact of consent can be 
negatived in circumstances where there is no communication of the fact of consent;81 
the complainant agrees as a result of threat, force or fear;82 was unlawfully detained;83 
the accused was in a position of trust or authority;84 consent was obtained by fraud;85 
the complainant was mistaken as to the identity or nature of the activity;86 was asleep, 
unconscious or intoxicated;87 or was unable to understand the nature of the activity.88 
 
 
67 Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s48: “(1) A person (the offender) is guilty of the 
offence of rape if he or she engages, or continues to engage, in sexual intercourse with another 
person who— (a) does not consent to engaging in the sexual intercourse; or (b) has withdrawn 
consent to the sexual intercourse, and the offender knows, or is recklessly indifferent to, the fact 
that the other person does not so consent or has so withdrawn consent (as the case may be). 
Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for life. (2) A person (the offender) is guilty of the offence of 
rape if he or she compels a person to engage, or to continue to engage, in—(a) sexual intercourse 
with a person other than the offender; or (b) an act of sexual self-penetration; or (c) an act of 
bestiality, when the person so compelled does not consent to engaging in the sexual intercourse 
or act, or has withdrawn consent to the sexual intercourse or act, and the offender knows, or is 
recklessly indifferent to, the fact that the person does not so consent or has so withdrawn 
consent (as the case may be). Maximum penalty: Imprisonment for life.” 
68 Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s46(2). 
69 Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s46(3)(a). 
70 Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s46(3)(b). 
71 Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s46(3)(c). 
72 Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s46(3)(d). 
73 Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s46(3)(e). 
74 Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s46(3)(f). 
75 Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s46(3)(g). 
76 Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s46(3)(h). 
77 Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas) s185: “(1) Any person who has sexual intercourse with another 
person without that person's consent is guilty of a crime.” 
78 Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas) s124. 
79 Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas) s124(3). 
80 Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas), s2A. 
81 Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas) s2A(2)(a). 
82 Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas) s2A(2)(b)(c). 
83 Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas) s2A(2)(d). 
84 Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas) s2A(2)(e). 
85 Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas) s2A(2)(f). 
86 Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas) s2A(2)(g). 
87 Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas) s2A(2)(h). 
88 Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas) s2A(2)(i). 






In Victoria, the common law of rape is also on a statutory footing. Here, as in other 
jurisdictions, the absence of consent is a specific element of the offence.89 Consent is a 
defined term in this jurisdiction, which requires, simply, “free agreement”.90 As is the 
case elsewhere, consent may be negatived where there is actual or threatened force;91 
fear of harm;92 the complainant was unlawfully detained;93 asleep or unconscious;94 
substantially intoxicated95 (including being unable to withdraw consent because of 
intoxication);96 the person could not understand the nature of the act,97 or its sexual 
nature;98 the complainant with mistaken about the identity of the accused;99 or that the 
act was not for a legitimate medical or hygienic purpose;100 mistaken about the use of 
animals; 101  the complainant fails to do anything to indicate consent; 102  or initially 
consents, but later retracts consent.103 
 
7. Western Australia 
 
Like Queensland, West Australia codified rape in its Criminal Code. However, the 
offence was modified as is now expressed as “sexual penetration without consent”.104 It 
has ordinary and aggravated forms, 105 with specific offences concerning the sexual 
penetration of children.106 In this jurisdiction, consent means freely and voluntarily 
given.107 Without limiting the circumstances through which the fact of lack of consent 
is negatived, in this state the absence of consent includes “consent is not freely and 
voluntarily given if it is obtained by force, threat, intimidation, deceit, or any fraudulent 




This general survey of the meaning of consent throughout Australia confirms a settled 
position in law, and that is that consent, for the purposes of sexual activity, is grounded 
in terms that are basically contractual. That is, the parties engage in a shared agreement 
to engage in sexual activity. Ideally, that arrangement would be one of mutual 
enjoyment and an expression of intimacy, if not affection. The law cannot, of course, 
ensure these qualitative aspects of intimacy; but it can ensure that the decision to 
 
89 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s38: “(1) A person (A) commits an offence if— (a) A intentionally 
sexually penetrates another person (B); and (b) B does not consent to the penetration; and (c) 
A does not reasonably believe that B consents to the penetration. (2) A person who commits an 
offence against subsection (1) is liable to level 2 imprisonment (25 years maximum).” 
90 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s36(1). 
91 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s36(2)(a). 
92 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s36(2)(b). 
93 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s36(2)(c). 
94 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s36(2)(d). 
95 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s36(2)(e). 
96 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s36(2)(f). 
97 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s36(2)(g). 
98 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s36(2)(h). 
99 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s36(2)(i). 
100 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s36(2)(j). 
101 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s36(2)(k). 
102 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s36(2)(l). 
103 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s36(2)(m). 
104  Criminal Code 1913 (WA) s325(1): “A person who sexually penetrates another person 
without the consent of that person is guilty of a crime and is liable to imprisonment for 14 years.” 
105  Criminal Code 1913 (WA) s326(1): “A person who sexually penetrates another person 
without the consent of that person in circumstances of aggravation is guilty of a crime and liable 
to imprisonment for 20 years.” 
106 Criminal Code 1913 (WA) ss322, 321, 320. 
107 Criminal Code 1913 (WA) s319(2)(a). 
108 Criminal Code 1913 (WA) s319(2)(c). 




engage in those activities is a rational one, based on free choice. In each of the 
jurisdictions examined, consent is understood as an agreement to engage in sexual 
activity, given voluntarily. That necessarily implies some understanding of the scope of 
what activities are going to be engaged in. This is consistent with what is known as as 
the “communicative” model of consent, which focuses the practical attempts in law to 
ensure mutual understanding, autonomy and personal responsibility.109 
 
Yet as we have seen, in each jurisdiction there is clear recognition that consent can be 
obtained through a variety of means that are not regarded as legitimate forms of 
agreement. Indeed, there is no agreement because one of the parties has not expressed 
true consent or was not in possession of sufficient facts to enable an informed decision. 
Even in cases where a sexual advance was communicated and understood, the reality 
of communication is such that what is communicated and understood is not necessarily 
clear at a practical level. Accordingly, each jurisdiction contains provisions that will 
negative the fact of consent or enable the tribunal of fact to conclude there was no 
consent if the issue is ambiguous. 
 
IV. CONSENT IN THE ACT 
 
The one jurisdiction in Australia where the question of consent is far from clear is the 
ACT. Here the criminal law, generally, is currently in a less than settled state, resting 
in an unfinished transition from a common law to a code jurisdiction. It is the only 
jurisdiction in Australia where a Crimes Act and a Criminal Code are operating 
concurrently as the basis of local law. 110  This results in a substantial degree of 
complexity, and uncertainty. The difficulty arises because the Code is only “partially 
operational”, which means that the general principles of criminal responsibility found 
in Chapter 2 of the Code do not apply to every offence. In many cases the common law 
and its associated linkages with legislation continues to operate. 
  
In the context of sex offences, Part 3 of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) prohibits sexual 
assault. Unlike NSW, sexual assault offences in the ACT are in three degrees, based on 
injury suffered by the complainant.111 Here the accused may be charged with sexual 
assault in the first degree if they inflict grievous bodily harm on the complainant;112 in 
the second degree if they inflict actual bodily harm;113 in the third degree if the attack 
involves an assault or threat of injury;114 or an ordinary charge of sexual intercourse 
without consent.115 It is important to note that of these offences, only the latter charge 
requires the absence of consent as an element of the offence. 
 
For the purposes of sexual intercourse without consent, section 67 of the Crimes Act 
1900 (ACT) defines consent in the following terms: 
(1) …without limiting the grounds on which it may be established that 
consent is negated, the consent of a person to sexual intercourse with 
another person … is negated if that consent is caused— 
 
109  James Monaghan and Gail Mason, 'Communicative consent in New South Wales: 
Considering Lazarus v R' (2018) 43(2) Alternative Law Journal 96. 
110 The Commonwealth Criminal Code also applies concurrently throughout Australia, but as 
that Code does not purport to criminalise sexual assaults this issue does not arise. 
111 NSW introduced four categories of sexual assault in a set of reforms in 1981. (Crimes (Sexual 
Assault) Amendment Act 1981 (NSW)). These provisions served as a model and were operative 
when the ACT introduced the three categories in 1985. See Crimes (Amendment) Ordinance 
(No. 5) 1985. The NSW categories were subsequently repealed and changed in 1989 (Crimes 
Amendment Act 1989 (NSW)).  
112 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s51. 
113 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s52. 
114 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s53. 
115 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s54. 




(a) by the infliction of violence or force on the person, or on a third person 
who is present or nearby; or 
(b) by a threat to inflict violence or force on the person, or on a third 
person who is present or nearby; or  
(c) by a threat to inflict violence or force on, or to use extortion against, 
the person or another person; or 
(d) by a threat to publicly humiliate or disgrace, or to physically or 
mentally harass, the person or another person; or  
(e) by the effect of intoxicating liquor, a drug or an anaesthetic; or  
(f) by a mistaken belief as to the identity of that other person; or  
(g) by a fraudulent misrepresentation of any fact made by the other 
person, or by a third person to the knowledge of the other person; or  
(h) by the abuse by the other person of his or her  position of authority 
over, or professional or other trust in relation to, the person; or 
(i) by the person’s physical helplessness or mental incapacity to 
understand the nature of the act in relation to which the consent is 
given; or  
(j) by the unlawful detention of the person.  
(2) A person who does not offer actual physical resistance to sexual 
intercourse shall not, by reason only of that fact, be regarded as consenting 
to the sexual intercourse. 
 
At first glance this definition appears entirely consistent with the law as it stands across 
Australia. It sets out the circumstances through which consent can be negated and does 
so on the basis of indicia common to all Australian jurisdictions. But what is missing is 
any reference to the meaning of consent. It is a negative definition, telling us what 
consent is not, rather than what it is. Otherwise there is no express statement as to the 
meaning of consent. This position seems to be at odds with the law around the country, 
and it begs the question why this is the case. 
 
In the absence of any statutory embodiment, the default position is the common law. 
As it stands, there are actually only a handful of authorities in the ACT that indicate the 
correct position. 
 
A Grey v The Queen [2019]116 
 
Grey was a decision of Chief Justice Murrell. This case involved the prosecution of a 
brothel owner on 27 charges linked to the “training” of sex workers in the ACT. Here 
the accused advertised for sex workers to work in his brothel, but required each of the 
women involved to engage in sex with him as a “training” process. This case was 
concerned with the appropriate directions to be given to the jury with respect to the 
meaning of the accused having “authority” over the women sufficient to vitiate consent 
under s67(1)(h) of the meaning of consent outlined above. Murrell CJ set out the 
required directions.117 Here her Honour made passing reference to the limits of s67,118 
but otherwise did not address the question of consent other than the scope of its limits 
required under s67(1)(h). It was clear, however, that the Crown was relying on consent 
as meaning “free and voluntary”.119 
 
 
116 [2019] ACTSC 315. 
117 [2019] ACTSC 315 [22]. 
118 [2019] ACTSC 315 [10]-[13]. 
119 [2019] ACTSC 315 [4]. 




B Agresti v The Queen [2017] 
 
Agresti is a decision of the Court of Appeal.120 This was an appeal against conviction 
for one count of sexual intercourse without consent, pursuant to s54 of the Crimes Act 
1900 (ACT). The accused had engaged in sexual intercourse with the complainant after 
a night out drinking. There was strong evidence indicating the complainant was 
substantially intoxicated, and also evidence that the question of consent was never 
clearly articulated by either party during the event. One of the issues at trial was 
evidence that suggested the complainant was so intoxicated that she “lapsed in and out 
of consciousness”.121 The basis of the appeal was a direction given to the jury with 
respect to the meaning of consent.  Here the learned trial judge (Murrell CJ), gave the 
following direction: 
Before you can consent to an act of intercourse or anything for that matter, you 
must have the opportunity to do so. What that means is if a person is asleep or 
unconscious at the time that an act of intercourse occurs, they cannot have 
consented because they did not have – unless of course they agree before they 
fell asleep or something like that but let’s not worry about those complications; 
that the person cannot have consented if they were unconscious at the time 
because they were incapable of consenting. They had no opportunity to consent 
freely and voluntarily.122 
 
In this case the direction was held to be inadequate, as the direction did not properly 
address the possibility of the shifting consciousness.123 The appeal was allowed, and a 
new trial ordered. However, their Honours did not doubt the gist of consent as “freely 
and voluntarily given”. However, no authorities were cited in either case to confirm the 
relevant legal foundations for the principle. 
 
C R v Tamawiwy (No 2)124 
 
Tamawiwy is part of a rather extraordinary group of cases, illustrating the lengths that 
people go to for sex. Here, Mr Tamawiwy established a fake Facebook identity, 
representing himself as a woman who was part of a bisexual community in Canberra. 
When contacted by interested parties (young men), discussions would take place online 
in which it was suggested the woman was prepared to engage in a threesome with the 
young man, on condition that he have sex with Tamawiwy (using another false name). 
The complainant in this case agreed, and consensual homosexual intercourse took 
place. In addition, the intercourse was filmed. When the complainant then sought to 
make contact with the two women, they were nowhere to be found – since they did not 
exist. In effect, consent was obtained through fraud. Tamawiwy was later charged with 
two counts of sexual intercourse without consent, and one count of an act of indecency, 
pursuant to s54 and s60 of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) respectively. Further charges 
were laid, bringing the indictment to a total of 14 counts. After pleading guilty to five 
counts, the remaining charges were put to trial.125 
 
This case was an interlocutory proceeding, in the sense that accused challenged the 
Crown’s reliance on s67(1)(g) of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) and was seeking a direct 
acquittal. Relevantly, that section negative consent where there had been fraudulent 
misrepresentation by the accused. In this case, that was alleged to be the existence of 
two woman who did not, in fact, exist at all. A no case submission was made with 
 
120 [2017] ACTCA 20, Refshauge, Burns and Rangiah JJ. 
121 [2017] ACTCA 20 [114]. 
122 [2017] ACTCA 20 [110]. 
123 [2017] ACTCA 20 [113]. Interestingly, their Honours were drawing specifically from two West 
Australian cases, Ibbs v The Queen [1988] WAR 91 and Saibu v The Queen (1992) 10 WAR 279, 
both of which necessarily draw on the provisions of the West Australian Criminal Code. 
124 [2015] ACTSC 302. 
125 [2015] ACTSC 302 [1]-[11]. 




respect to three of the charges, on the basis that there was no misrepresentation of 
identity, rather the issue was at best a promise to engage in sexual activity. Refshauge 
J dismissed the application, on the basis the evidence was capable of supporting a 
conclusion that the complainant had been induced to engage in sexual intercourse with 
the accused on that basis.126 
 
In reaching this conclusion, Refshauge J made an important contribution to our 
understanding of the law relating to consent by undertaking a historical analysis of s67. 
His Honour traced the section from its initial introduction as s92P in 1985,127 later 
renumbered as s67 in 2001.128 The section was introduced for the purpose of extending 
the grounds for “vitiating” consent on the basis of fraud or mistake, previously found 
in common law.129 Refshauge J observed that section 92P “was not preceded by any 
apparent policy consideration in the Territory,”130 but did note that the Explanatory 
Memorandum made passing reference to a Tasmanian Law Reform Commission  
(‘TLRC’) Report.131 That report recommended implementing a provision in Tasmania 
based on a draft proposal for the Model Code of the Northern Territory.132 Here the 
TLRC endorsed the view that when the law requires evidence of consent from the 
complainant, it has the effect of shifting attention to the conduct of the complainant 
before, during and after the event, rather than directing attention to the conduct of the 
accused. This position was specifically endorsed by the Women’s Electoral Lobby in 
Tasmania. Refshauge J concluded: 
It appears that the relevant provision was not inserted in the Northern Territory 
legislation but a form of the Law Reform Commission’s recommendation was 
introduced in Tasmania in s 2A of the Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas). This 
Territory and Tasmania appear to be the only jurisdictions which have accepted 
the wide form of the provision, despite most other jurisdictions reforming the 
provisions relating to consent in respect of non-consensual sexual 
intercourse.133 
 
The “form” introduced in Tasmania was initially introduced in 1987,134 although it has 
since undergone numerous amendments (that have largely expanded the definition). 
Notably, the newly inserted s2A contained both a positive and negative meaning of 
consent. Here consent was considered present when it was freely given.135 That aside, 
the reference to the purpose behind a negative meaning of consent cannot be 
overlooked. Quoting the TLRC, Refshauge J noted that the effect of a negative meaning 
shifted the emphasis at trial away from the complainant, and onto the conduct of the 
accused. There is an important public policy aspect to the way in which consent is 
constructed in legislation.136 
 
126 [2015] ACTSC 302 [67]. 
127 Crimes (Amendment) Ordinance (No 5) 1985 (ACT). 
128 Crimes Legislation Amendment Act 2001 (ACT). 
129 R v Clarence (1888) 22 QBD 23; Papadimitropoulos v The Queen (1957) 98 CLR 249; 
Michael v Western Australia [2008] WASCA 66; (2008) 183 A Crim R 348. 
130 [2015] ACTSC 302 [25]. 
131 Tasmanian Law Reform Commission, Report and Recommendations on Rape and Sexual 
Offences, Report No 31, (1982). 
132 A digital copy of this report is available at: 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/90161NCJRS.pdf. 
133 [2015] ACTSC 302 [28]. 
134 Criminal Code Amendment (Sexual Offences) Act 1987 (Tas). 
135 Criminal Code Amendment (Sexual Offences) Act 1987 (Tas), s4: ‘2A-(1) In the code, unless 
the contrary intention appears, a reference to consent means a reference to a consent which is 
freely given by a rational and sober person so situated as to be able to form a rational opinion 
upon the matter to which the consent is given’.” 
136  The Tasmanian Law Reform Commission Report specifically observed initiatives of the 
Michigan Criminal Sexual Conduct Reforms, which had effectively removed consent from the 
elements of sex offences entirely. See Law Reform Commission, Report and Recommendations 
on Rape and Sexual Offences, (Government Printer, Tasmania, 1982) Report No 31, 15. The 





Although the case hinged on the provisions that vitiated consent, it is clear that 
Refshauge J clearly endorsed the common law meaning of consent as being “freely and 
voluntarily given”. His Honour referred to both Code definitions137 and common law in 
the decision, notably the reasoning of King CJ in Question of Law Reserved.138 It 
should be noted that Mr Tamawiwy was subsequently convicted of 24 counts of various 
acts of sexual intercourse, acts of indecency, and using a carriage service to menace, 
harass or cause offence.139 
 
D R v Ardler [2003] 
 
R v Ardler140 was a decision of the ACT Supreme Court before Justice Crispin. The case 
involved non-consensual sexual intercourse. The complainant had an intellectual 
disability. The couple had been friends for many years. On the night in question the 
accused had missed his bus, and was allowed to sleep at the complainant’s home. In 
the early hours of the morning the accused climbed into bed with the complainant, who 
later awoke to find the accused groping her breasts, which was soon followed by penile-
vaginal intercourse. Complex issues arose in the case in relation to the knowledge of 
lack of consent on the part of the accused, further complicated by a long history of 
mental illness. Ultimately the accused was found not guilty by reason of mental illness. 
 
What is instructive in this case are the sentencing remarks of Crispin J on the question 
of liability: 
The offence with which the accused stands charged has three elements. First, 
the accused must have engaged in sexual intercourse with the complainant; 
second, he must have done so without her consent; and, third at the time he did 
so he must have either known that she did not consent or have been reckless as 
to whether she was consenting ….141 
In the context of the second element of the offence the concept of consent 
means a free and voluntary consent.142 
 
This is as clear a statement as you can get. However, Justice Crispin deployed no 
authority to confirm the source of the principle. Indeed, he may not have needed to do 
so since, as stated by King CJ in Question of Law Reserved, the principle seems to be 
well settled – or at least regarded as an establish principle. 
 
V. THE PROBLEM OF THE BINARY CONSENT MODEL 
 
The discussion above indicates that the ACT is the only jurisdiction in Australia that 
defines consent in negative terms. That is, the common law provides a basic principle 
that consent means “free and voluntary”, with a related statutory rule that will negate 
the fact of consent when one or more the statutory elements exist. This model is, in fact, 
a two-part model of consent that is broadly consistent with the other jurisdictions. The 
point of departure is the absence of a statutory definition of consent. This is apparently 
found in the common law. 
 
The first issue here is the assumption there is a problem. Does it really matter that the 
ACT has a negative consent model? Indeed, the Law Reform literature, and particularly 
 
issue was also discussed in Simon Bronitt, 'Rape and Lack of Consent' (1992) 16(4) Criminal 
Law Journal 289. (Also referred to by Refshauge J in Tamawiwy) 
137 [2015] ACTSC 302 [36] and [43]. 
138 [2015] ACTSC 302 [44] 
139 The Queen v Tamawiwy (No 4) [2015] ACTSC 371. 
140 [2003] ACTSC 24. 
141 [2003] ACTSC 24 [30]. 
142 [2003] ACTSC 24 [32]. 




the feminist scholarship, strongly advocates a negative model on the basis that the 
attention of the trial is shifted at a tactical and structural level away from the question 
of whether the complainant gave consent, and onto the conduct of the accused’s 
conduct that deprived the consent of its voluntary foundations.143  
  
The problem with the negative model is that it appears that consent in sexual assault 
cases has moved on from a binary model of “consent”. As is evident in all Australian 
jurisdictions, the question is now a hybrid model that requires, in effect, a three-stage 
evaluation. The first step requires attending to the question of consent at all; and if 
consent was given, or ambiguous, a second step has evolved that requires attention to 
either the honest and reasonable mistake of the accused in the validity of the belief, or 
conduct on the part of the accused that vitiated consent even when it was given. There 
is now recognition that context plays a role in the assessment of consent, an important 
development as empirical studies are now showing that context will shape the 
behaviour of sex offenders. Indeed, serial offenders will often engineer specific 
circumstances that make offending easier and legally ambiguous.144 To a large extent 
that is a natural consequence of the way in which the binary model has evolved. There 
is recognition that consent can, in practice, result in something more than “Yes/No” 
answer. In some situations the response and/or interpretation is vague: and in some 
cases the defendant’s only line of defence is painting the situation in vague terms in 
order to enliven the defence of mistake of fact. In effect, the circumstances in which the 
consent was given will qualify the consent if given or doubtful. This is represented in 




Whether a negative consent model like the ACT actually has the effect of shifting 
attention away from the complainant is open to debate. There is always some necessity 
in soliciting evidence from the accused to establish the threshold question of consent. 
This is a legal fact. It is the same in all jurisdictions. However, once the threshold 
question of consent has been established, the law, and associated trial, quickly shifts 
into an analysis of the circumstances of the consent. This is undoubtedly a positive 
development.  
 
143 Wells and Quick, above n 3. 
144  Ashley Hewitt and Eric Beauregard, 'Sexual Crime And Place: The Impact Of The 





































The apparent issue here is concerned with the source of law. The ACT is certainly 
lacking a statutory declaration as to the meaning of consent. However, given the 
common law meaning of that concept this is not necessarily an issue, apart from 
national consistency. Given that it appears a settled principle in law and practice in the 
ACT, at the very least a statutory reform to that effect would import consistency. 
 
VI. REFORMING CONSENT IN THE ACT 
 
Substantive and procedural reforms relating to rape and sexual offences have been a 
feature of Australian law for the last 25 years or more.145 Importantly, in 2010 the 
Australian Law Reform Commission recommended that consent be placed on a 
statutory footing in all jurisdictions. In its report on Family Violence – A National 
Legal Response, 146  the ALRC made four specific recommendations in relation to 
consent. First, that a statutory definition of consent be based on “free and voluntary 
agreement”.147 Second, that consent be vitiated on the basis of a “non-exhaustive list of 
circumstances” that include lack of capacity, acquiescence through fear, threats, 
unlawful detention, abuse of authority or trust, mistaken identity or understanding of 
the nature of the act(s), and intimidation or coercion.148 Third, a statutory defence be 
available based on honest and reasonable belief in consent. And finally, that judges be 
required to give directions on the meaning of consent to juries. 149  Additional 
recommendations suggested enacting provisions concerned with the objectives of 
legislation and judicial statements about the nature of sex offending in sentencing 
decisions.150 Broadly speaking, all Australian jurisdictions except the ACT have enacted 
statutory rules based on these recommendations. 
 
At the time of writing, a Private Member’s Bill is before the Legislative Assembly in the 
ACT.151 Introduced on 11 April 2018, the Crimes (Consent) Amendment Bill152 provides, 
inter alia, to amend s67 of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) by inserting the following: 
(1) For a sexual offence consent provision, consent of a person to an act 
mentioned in a sexual offence consent provision by another 
person means— 
 (a) the person gives free and voluntary agreement; and  
 (b) the other person— 
 (i) knows the agreement was freely and voluntarily given; or 
 (ii) is satisfied on reasonable grounds that the agreement was 
freely and voluntarily given. 
 (1A) Without limiting the grounds on which it may be established that consent 
is negated, the consent of a person to an act mentioned in a sexual offence 
consent provision is negated if that consent is caused— 
 
145 Tasmanian Law Reform Commission, Report and Recommendations on Rape and Sexual 
Offences, (1982) Report No 31; Victorian Law Reform Commission, Sexual Offences: Law and 
Procedure Final Report (2004); New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Consent in 
Relation to Sexual Offences (2019); Queensland Law Reform Commission, Review of Consent 
Laws and the Excuse of Mistake of Fact (2020). 
146 Australian Law Reform Commission, Family Violence : A National Legal Response: Final 
Report (2010). 
147 Ibid 37. Recommendation 25-4. 
148 Ibid. Recommendation 25-5. 
149 Ibid. Recommendation 25-6. 
150 Ibid 38. Recommendations 25-8, 25-9. 
151 The Bill was introduced by the Hon Caroline Le Couteur, MLA (Greens) on 11 April 2018. The 
Bill was presented as an exposure draft, specifically intended to implement the 2010 
recommendations of the ALRC. 
152 https://www.legislation.act.gov.au/b/db_57900/. 





This amendment imports the two-step tests that are consistent with other jurisdictions 
around Australia. It is important to note that the definition relates to “a sexual offence 
consent provision”, which includes sexual intercourse without consent, as well as the 
non-consensual distribution of intimate images.153 The Bill was then referred to the 
Standing Committee on Justice and Community Safety, as part of its function as 
scrutineer of legislation required by the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT).154 As criminal 
law routinely has the capacity to interfere with human rights, the Bill was necessarily 
considered. The Committee explained the effect of the amendment in these terms: 
The Bill will amend the current approach in the ACT by defining consent of a 
person for those various sexual offences (as well as the proposed new defence 
in section 66A applying to young persons of a similar age). A person will 
consent when they give free and voluntary agreement; and the other person 
knows the agreement was freely and voluntarily given, or is satisfied on 
reasonable grounds that the agreement was freely and voluntarily given. The 
effect of this provision will be that the prosecution can establish the mental 
element of lack of consent through showing that there were no reasonable 
grounds open to the defendant to believe that the agreement was freely and 
voluntarily given. It is intended that the Bill will remove the ability of the 
defendant to show that they had an honest belief that the other person had 
consented where that belief was not reasonable in the circumstances. As the Bill 
increases the evidential burden on the defendant to establish the 
reasonableness of their belief that the other person was consenting, the Bill will 
extend the circumstances in which an innocent person may be found guilty 
because they are unable to meet their evidential burden. The Bill therefore 
engages the right to the presumption of innocence protected by section 22 of 
the HRA.155 
 
The concern with this was articulated by the Human Rights Commission (ACT)(‘HRC’), 
which made formal submissions on the exposure draft of the Bill. According to the 
HRC, the question of consent, at least as it related to the definition of consent in its 
application to intimate image abuse, may have the effect of: 
Placing a legal burden on the defendant in these circumstances gives rise to a 
serious risk that a person may be convicted, not because he/she committed the 
criminal act, but because they were unable to overcome the burden (emphasis 
added) placed upon them to show they did not.156 
 
This conclusion arises out of the language used in the amendment. Both limbs require 
the accused to establish that they had actual knowledge of consent, or to establish the 
existence of reasonable grounds for the belief. In both cases the focus at trial would be, 
in effect, at least an evidential, if not a legal burden on the part of the accused. 
Accordingly, the HRC advised against approving the Bill in its current form, advising: 
As the explanatory statement suggests, the extent of any limitation of this right 
is ‘difficult to ascertain at this stage’. The Committee is concerned that the new 
definition of consent may result in substantial changes to how knowledge or 
recklessness of the lack of consent is established. In particular, by including the 
need for an defendant to be satisfied on reasonable grounds within the 
definition of consent, and applying that definition to a number of offences, it is 
difficult to determine the extent of the evidential or legal burdens that may be 
 
153 This is also a proposed amendment set out in s67(4) of the Bill: “(4) In this section: sexual 
offence consent provision means any of the following: (a) section 54; (b) section 55 (3) (b); (c) 
section 60; (d) section 61 (3) (b); (e) section 66A (2) (c).” 
154 Section 38(1) of that Act provides: ‘The relevant standing committee must report to the 
Legislative Assembly about human rights issues raised by bills presented to the Assembly’. 
155 ACT Legislative Assembly, Standing Committee on Justice and Community Safety (ACT), 
Scrutiny Report 17 (2018) 2. 
156 Ibid. 




faced by the defendant, such as whether they will need have evidence going both 
to their state of mind and the reasonableness of that state of mind. Therefore, 
the Committee is not satisfied, on the information available to it, that the 
amendments to the definition of consent will have only a reasonable limitation 
on the right to the presumption of innocence. The Committee therefore 
recommends that an inquiry is needed to establish the possible operation and 
impact of the amendments to the definition of consent included in the Bill.157 
 
The Bill, having been identified as a potential problem, was then opened to the public 
for submissions on the way forward.158 This inquiry closed in September 2018, having 
received 28 submissions. The subsequent report was published in October 2018.159 
Simply stated, 160  the report affirmed the view of the Committee that the ACT not 
proceed with the Bill as tabled.161 Further, it recommended that any legislative changes 
be delayed until after the publication of the findings of the NSWLRC on the issue of 
consent.162 The Report did, however explicitly state that: 
[A] definition of consent based on a concept of free and voluntary agreement, 
and affirmative and communicative consent be considered for enactment into 
ACT law.163 
 
In short, the ACT is in the process of bringing the statutory definition of consent into 
line with the 2010 ALRC recommendations, consistent with other jurisdictions in 
Australia. It is just a matter of time. What is worth noting about the focus of the 
Committee was not the question of whether or not the meaning of consent was at issue, 
but rather the perception or knowledge of genuine consent in the mind of the accused. 
In other words, the issue goes towards the knowledge of the accused rather than any 




The ACT has been slow to effect legislative changes. This appears to be the result of 
three connected factors. The first of these is the feminist jurisprudence behind negative 
models of consent. As outlined above, that jurisprudence is concerned with a focus on 
the conduct of the accused and the circumstances of the conduct, rather than the 
communication of consent on the part of the complainant. There is much to respect in 
that policy, grounded as it is in the overriding concern to protect the complainant as 
much as possible during the trial process. The problem here is twofold. Firstly, that the 
question of consent is necessarily a part of any sexual offence allegation, and continued 
to operate in the ACT at common law and in practice in spite of the statutory 
framework. Questions routinely were asked about the communication of consent 
during sexual assault trials despite the focus implied by s67 of the Crimes Act. 
Secondly, the emergence of a national approach to consent left s67 behind, notably 
after the ALRC published its report and associated recommendations in 2010. As a 
result, the negative model of consent has come to be seen as an anomaly rather than 
sound policy. 
 
The second aspect of the conservative position in the ACT is undoubtedly the effect of 
the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT), and the strong influence of the Human Rights 
 




159 ACT Legislative Assembly, Standing Committee On Justice And Community Safety (ACT), 
Report On Inquiry Into The Crimes (Consent)Amendment Bill 2018 (2018). 
160 The Report contained 10 recommendations. 
161 Standing Committee on Justice and Community Safety, above n 158. Recommendation 1 
162 Ibid. Recommendation 2. 
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Commission in legislative activity in this jurisdiction. This is not to suggest that the 
HRC stands in opposition of consent reforms. That is not the case. Rather, the 
necessary concern of the HRC is to provide high-level input into legislative design that 
has the potential to impact on domestic and internationally recognised human rights. 
As the criminal law is fundamentally linked to those questions, matters that have the 
potential to erode, compromise or threaten human rights are of necessary concern. As 
discussed above, the concern with recent amendments has been the question of 
whether the legislation effectively imposed an evidential, of not legal burden on the 
accused to establish the existence and content of consent communication. As a result, 
statutory reforms in this area will always be delayed because of the “precautionary 
logic” that operates in organisations that are effectively concerned with risk 
assessment.164 Because reforms in this area present a legal risk to the question of 
rights, the recommended approach is necessarily a cautious one. 
 
Associated with this is the problem associated with making reforms in an area of 
complex law. The ACT, being, ostensibly, a Code jurisdiction that continues to operate 
a common law foundation, and reform in areas that have such complex substantive and 
procedural law inevitably requires a painstaking analysis of the implications of any 
proposed reform. Submissions before the Standing Committee discussed above show a 
serious concern with how the operation of consent reforms would play out in a 
courtroom, especially in front of a jury. 
 
All things considered, it is no surprise as to why legislators in the ACT have preferred 
an approach that is awaiting the outcome of the NSW Law Reform Commission’s own 
inquiry into the laws of consent. This inquiry commenced in May 2018, in the wake of 
the Lazarus trials in that state.165 This report has still yet to be published. It is worth 
noting, however, that the Draft Proposals published for public comments specified that 
there were no plans to change the meaning of consent as currently provided as “free 
and voluntary”. Rather, the intention was to extend the circumstances where consent 
may be vitiated.166 This being the case, it seems very likely that consent in the ACT will 
shortly involve a similar hybrid as other Australian jurisdictions, involving an explicit 
meaning of consent on a statutory basis, with a series of statutory circumstances where 
consent may be vitiated. The story will not, however, end there. It seems likely this area 
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